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Abstract
Applied to uncertainty communication, politeness theory postulates that when announcing bad news (1) speakers may
intend not only to inform, but also to manage (e.g., save) the hearers’ or speakers’ own faces (i.e., face-managing intentions),
and (2) speakers may perform face-managing intentions by altering the explicitly communicated probability. Previous research
has assumed these two core postulates when explaining various reasoning and judgment phenomena in hearers, but has failed
to test them empirically in a comprehensive and direct way: jointly in relation to speakers. To provide this critical evidence,
we asked subjects to communicate a predefined numerical probability of two negative outcomes, using a verbal probability
scale. Subjects reported their communication intentions afterwards. In line with the first politeness theory postulate, speakers
intended not only to be informative but also to tactfully announce bad news or to avoid being blamed in case they made
inaccurate (too low or too high) prediction. In line with the second politeness theory postulate, speakers altered their explicitly
communicated probability more often and more substantially when adopting face-managing intentions than when adopting
informative intentions. We discuss how this evidence corroborates the politeness theory and validates the previous research
that focused on hearers.
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1 Introduction
Politeness theory postulates the existence of a public self-
image that each individual tries to protect (Brown & Levin-
son, 1987). This image is posited to rely on two faces: the
positive face represents the need to be approved, valued and
desired, whereas the negative face represents the need to be
free and independent. Social interaction involves behaviour
that threatens the integrity of our public image, and there-
fore people often resort to face-management strategies to
preserve good relationships. Face-management strategies
harness conversational means to alleviate potential damage
to the positive and the negative faces of the conversational
partners (i.e., speakers and hearers). For example, speak-
ers may soften a criticism to avoid threatening the positive
faces of hearers and to avoid making them feel incompetent,
or speakers may avoid statements upsetting to hearers, thus
avoiding the implication that hearers’ feelings do not matter.
Simultaneously, speakers may be anxious about the possi-
ble threat to their own positive faces. For example, speakers
may under-estimate the probability of a negative outcome
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where they wish to avoid being blamed in hindsight for ex-
aggerating the probability. They may also over-estimate the
probability of the negative outcome where they worry about
being blamed in hindsight for underplaying the probability.
Hence, politeness theory relies, inter alia, on two core
postulates to account for variability in everyday communi-
cation. First, speakers announcing potentially upsetting in-
formation may intend to inform hearers, but may also intend
to manage the faces of hearers (hearer face-managing inten-
tion) or their own faces (speaker face-managing intention)
so as to limit damage to the public self-image of hearers or
of themselves (e.g., “loss of face”). Second, speakers adopt-
ing face-managing intentions deliver information that differs
from the information they actually have in mind.
The two postulates of politeness theory might be applied
to the communication of uncertainty associated with nega-
tive outcomes. First, speakers making a prediction may in-
tend not only to inform about a probability level, but also
to manage the hearers’ faces or their own (i.e., hearer and
speaker face-managing intentions) [hereafter Postulate 1].
Second, speakers perform face-managing intentions by al-
tering (e.g., lessening or magnifying) the explicitly commu-
nicated probability of a negative outcome [hereafter Pos-
tulate 2]. Thus, politeness theory posits that speakers use
uncertainty quantifiers to pursue informative intentions and
also to sugar-coat threatening news to manage the hearers’
or their own faces. For example, a physician could qualify
the likelihood of cancer developing in a patient as “likely”
in order to informatively communicate her opinion about the
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probability (i.e., informative intention). However, she could
also qualify it as “possible” rather than “likely” to communi-
cate the bad news more tactfully (i.e., hearer face-managing
intention). Alternatively, she could qualify it as “quite pos-
sible” rather than “likely” to communicate the likely diag-
nosis cautiously, in case the patient does not, in fact, turn
out to have cancer (i.e., speaker face-managing intention,
downward adjustment). She could also qualify it as “very
likely” rather than “likely” to communicate the likely diag-
nosis cautiously, in the case in which the patient does in-
deed turn out to have cancer (i.e., speaker face-managing
intention, upward adjustment), thus protecting her own face
against the embarrassment of missing the diagnosis.
Prior research has used both these postulates to derive hy-
potheses explaining different judgment and reasoning phe-
nomena in hearers receiving a face-threatening message:
indeed almost all previous research has focused on the
hearer. For instance, prior research has explained the sever-
ity effect as caused by hearers who inflated their subjec-
tive probability of a severe outcome on the basis of face-
managing considerations. Hearers assumed more frequently
that speakers use face-managing intentions when announc-
ing severe—face-threatening—outcomes rather than when
announcing less negative outcomes (Bonnefon & Villejou-
bert, 2006). In additional studies, hearers who assumed
speakers to be polite or cautious adjusted the numerical
meaning of various verbal and numerical quantifiers of neg-
ative outcomes upwards. They did so, because they believed
that face-managing speakers communicated a downplayed
probability (Juanchich, Sirota & Butler et al., 2012; Sirota
& Juanchich, 2012b). In a domain of reasoning, hearers de-
rived scalar inferences with existential quantifiers such as
“some” differently, depending on whether they thought the
speakers aimed to be tactful or not (Bonnefon, Feeney &
Villejoubert, 2009; Feeney & Bonnefon, 2013). Finally,
prior research pinpointed the practical danger of hearers’
polite misunderstandings in the communicated risk of, for
instance, health-related outcomes (Bonnefon, Feeney & De
Neys, 2011; Pighin & Bonnefon, 2011). In summary, prior
studies focused on the hearers—hearers’ inferences about
the speakers’ intentions guiding the interpretation of com-
municated information—rather than on the speakers. There-
fore, this previous research supports the two core postulates
only indirectly.
One notable exception to the focus on hearers is a study in
which the researchers manipulated the intentions of speak-
ers instead of hearers’ expectations of the speakers’ inten-
tions (Juanchich & Sirota, 2013). The researchers asked
subjects to either be informative, tactful, or cautious when
communicating the predefined probability of a negative out-
come. Consistent with the second postulate, the intentions
of speakers affected the probability they communicated:
tactful and cautious speakers communicated a lower proba-
bility than informative speakers. However, this study failed
to test the first postulate (i.e., speakers adopt these intentions
spontaneously) and to test the two postulates conjointly.
To test the first postulate is critical, because speakers may
spontaneously generate a different spectrum of communi-
cation intentions or different proportions of the intentions
than those assumed in Juanchich and Sirota’s study (2013).
Indeed, other authors have suggested that speakers, in gen-
eral, adopt mainly informative intentions (e.g., Grice, 1975).
If we follow the quality maxim of Grice (1975), which
prescribes speakers to be truthful in fulfilling the coopera-
tive principle of a conversation, then we could assume that
speakers would be as informative as possible and would say
what they believed to be true in a clear and unambiguous
manner (Grice, 1975).
To test the two politeness theory postulates conjointly is
also critical. Even if speakers naturally generate a simi-
lar spectrum of intentions and in comparable proportions
(Juanchich & Sirota, 2013), it is still possible that the nat-
urally adopted intentions, in contrast with those experimen-
tally enforced, could fail to affect the communicated proba-
bility. For example, speakers may intend to be tactful when
giving bad news but may not provide a lower probability
than informative speakers. Indeed, tactful speakers may
perform the face-managing function by different verbal or
non-verbal means to verbal probability expressions. Con-
sistent with such an alternative explanation of their findings,
Juanchich and Sirota (2013) discussed the possibility that
demand effects could have triggered the effects of intentions
on probability observed in their study.
2 The present research
In the present research, we aimed to devise a direct and com-
prehensive test of two postulates of politeness theory applied
to uncertainty communication by investigating speakers’ re-
ported intentions and their effect on communicated proba-
bility. We drew two hypotheses from the two postulates of
politeness theory. First, we hypothesized that speakers will
spontaneously adopt face-managing intentions (i.e., hearer
or speaker face-managing intentions). Second, we hypoth-
esized that speakers adopting face-managing intentions will
communicate a different probability to speakers adopting in-
formative intentions. Specifically, speakers adopting hearer
face-managing intentions will communicate a lower proba-
bility. However, speakers adopting speaker face-managing
intentions will communicate either a lower or a higher prob-
ability. Some such speakers will worry about being blamed
in hindsight for over-emphasizing the probability of a nega-
tive outcome and some others for under-emphasizing it.
To test these hypotheses, we employed a paradigm in
which subjects took the role of speakers. Subjects commu-
nicated the possible occurrence of two negative outcomes to
a friend by selecting a verbal probability expression from
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a list and, then, reported their communication intentions.
This paradigm differs from those employed in prior research
in three important aspects. In contrast with “hearers’ stud-
ies” (e.g., Juanchich et al., 2012), subjects in the present
study took the role of speakers, not of hearers, to enable a
direct test of the politeness theory postulates. Further, the
present study differs in two ways from the previous study
that focused on speakers (Juanchich & Sirota, 2013). First,
subjects reported their own spontaneous intentions, not ex-
perimentally enforced ones, as well as their communicated
probability, to enable us to provide a comprehensive test.
Second, subjects reported their intentions after communi-
cating the probability, not before, to enable us to eliminate
the possible demand effects of intentions on probability.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Subjects and design
Based on our previous experience with these studies, we re-
cruited 132 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Subjects
were English speaking Americans who received $0.15 for
taking part in a three-minute study. Five subjects failed
to report their socio-demographic information. Subjects
represented a heterogeneous sample in terms of age (age
ranged from 18 to 67 years, M = 34.7, SD = 13.1), gen-
der (females: 60.6%), employment (working: 68.5%, un-
employed: 27.6%, retired: 3.9%), education (a majority
had at least some college education: 85.0%), and ethnicity
(Caucasian: 74.0%, Asian: 10.2%, Hispanic: 7.1%, African
American: 3.9%, and others: 4.7%).
Subjects communicated the probability of a negative out-
come to a hypothetical friend and then they reported the
communication they intended (informative, speaker face-
managing, hearer face-managing, or other), in two different
scenarios (car scenario and investment scenario), presented
randomly to each subject. The order of presentation of the
scenarios had no effect on the ascribed intentions, χ2(2) =
2.04, p = .173, nor on the perceived probabilities, t(262) =
0.83, p = .405.
2.1.2 Materials and procedure
After providing their informed consent, subjects read the
first of the two scenarios, selected a verbal probability to
communicate the bad news to a friend (i.e., 50% probability
of occurrence of a negative outcome) and subsequently re-
ported their communication intention, justifying their use of
the specific verbal probability expression. Note that subjects
could choose only one intention in each scenario. Subjects
responded to the same questions, presented in the same or-
der, for the second scenario. We used two scenarios describ-
ing a negative outcome to establish the robustness of the
structure of intentions and their effect on probability (both
adapted from Juanchich & Sirota, 2013, see Appendix). In
the car scenario, subjects communicated a 50% probability
that a friend’s newly-bought second-hand car would break
down. In the investment scenario, subjects communicated
a 50% probability that their friend’s stocks would lose their
value.
To communicate the 50% probability, subjects selected a
verbal probability from a list of seven expressions, convey-
ing various degrees of certainty from 10% to 90% (adopted
from Juanchich & Sirota, Experiment 1, 2013). The verbal
probability scale consisted of seven positive verbal proba-
bilities, ordered according to their probability magnitude,
from low probability expressions to high probability ones:
“a very small probability”, “a small probability”, “slightly
probable”, “evenly probable”, “rather probable”, “proba-
ble”, “quite probable”. We avoided negative expressions
such as unlikely or uncertain, to prevent subjects from se-
lecting a term for its directionality rather than for its prob-
ability magnitude (Teigen & Brun, 1999; Juanchich, Sirota,
Karelitz & Villejoubert, 2013).
Subjects reported their communication intentions by se-
lecting only one intention from the following four options: I
wanted to communicate the probability I had in mind (mea-
suring informative intentions); I tried to give my opinion in
the most tactful way (measuring hearer face-managing in-
tentions); I tried to be cautious, in case I could be wrong
(measuring speaker face-managing intentions); and other -
please provide an explanation in the space available (mea-
suring other possible intentions).
After answering the two questions for the two scenarios,
subjects estimated the numerical probabilities they associ-
ated with the seven verbal probabilities used in the verbal
probability scale but presented in a randomized order and
without specific context (i.e., not embedded into any specific
scenario). We asked subjects to estimate the communicated
probability (i.e., “In your opinion, what is the probability
communicated by the expressions presented here?”). Sub-
jects provided their estimates by positioning a cursor on a
visual analog 0-100% probability scale (increments of 1).
The scale had incremental anchors by 10 and three addi-
tional verbal/numerical probability anchors: 0%, no chance,
50%, and 100%, certain. The estimated number was simul-
taneously depicted to subjects as they moved the slide. The
numerical translation aimed to enable us to capture the nu-
merical meaning that each individual intended to convey
when choosing a particular verbal probability expression.
We chose to measure the numerical meaning of verbal prob-
abilities to cope with the large between-subjects variability
observed in numerical translation. For example, “it is pos-
sible” can mean 50% probability for a group of subjects,
but it can easily mean 30% for one of them and 70% for
another. The group-level numerical values also controlled
whether the probability magnitude order of the expressions
of the scale was preserved.
Figure 1 shows subjects’ ratings and indicates that the
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Figure 1: Subjective numerical probability associated with the verbal probability expressions used in the verbal probability
scale (symmetric bean plot combined with error bars showing 95% confidence interval of the mean). The blue lines represent
the overall median probability per expression. The polygons represent the density shape determined by a normal density
trace computed with a default bandwidth method using the Sheather-Jones method to select a bandwidth per batch and then
averaging bandwidths over all batches (see Kampstra, 2008).
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probability magnitude order was preserved and that the mid-
dle point (i.e., evenly probable) gave a good representation
of a 50% probability. Prior to the analysis, we translated
the verbal probabilities into the numerical probabilities that
each subject individually associated with the verbal prob-
abilities. For example, subject 08 selected the expression
“rather probable” in the car scenario and then quantified this
expression as conveying a “60%” probability in the follow-
up task and therefore, we translated the selection as “60%”,
whereas subject 94 selected the same expression but quanti-
fied it as conveying “80%” and therefore we translated this
selection as “80%”. Finally, subjects provided their socio-
demographic information. We analyzed data using the R
statistical programming language (R Core Team, 2014).
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Postulate 1: Proportion of speakers’ intentions.
Out of all 246 reported intentions, speakers intended not
only to be informative but also to tactfully announce bad
news or to avoid being blamed (Figure 2). Although sub-
jects reported most often informative intentions, they also
reported a substantial number of face-managing intentions:
41.6% of all intentions. The hearer face-managing inten-
tions were slightly more common than the speaker face-
managing intentions. Only a few speakers selected the
“other intention” response, aside from the options we pro-
vided: a likely indicator that the three studied intentions
covered quite well the spectrum of the speakers’ commu-
nication goals. These findings support the first hypothesis
positing that speakers not only adopt informative intentions,
but also face-managing intentions.
Two other findings deserve more attention. The propor-
tion of speakers’ intentions differed only minimally across
the Investment and Car scenarios (Figure 2). Indeed, a
marginal homogeneity test pointed to an equality of the
rowmarginal proportions (Investment Scenario) and the cor-
responding column proportions (Car Scenario), since we
found no statistically significant difference, MH statistic: M
= 147.5, SD = 7.0; p = .476. Furthermore, and consistently
with the first observation, subjects often reported relatively
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Figure 2: Speakers’ intentions in the Car and the Invest-
ment scenario in % (n = 132, Error bars represent 95% CIs).
“Hearer FM” = hearer face-managing intentions, “Speaker
FM” = speaker face-managing intentions, “Informative” =
informative intentions, “Other” = other than the pre-defined
intentions.
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similar intentions for the two scenarios, between which we
found a statistically significant association, χ2(9) = 22.53, p
= .008, Cramer’s V = 0.24 (Figure 3).
Interestingly, only a few subjects defined their own in-
tentions (i.e., the category “other intention”), beyond the
options we provided, n = 18. Ten of the other intentions
actually described one of the three types of predefined in-
tentions or a combination of these (e.g., being informative:
This could seriously affect my friend so I would try to be very
blunt and honest for his sake). Four of them described a new
“better safe than sorry” intention, according to which sub-
jects exaggerated the probability of occurrence of the nega-
Figure 3: Relative intra-individual consistency in adopting
intentions in the Investment and Car scenarios. “Hearer
FM” = hearer face-managing intentions, “Speaker FM” =
speaker face-managing intentions, “Informative” = informa-
tive intentions, “Other” = other than pre-defined intentions.
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tive outcome so as to err on the safe side (e.g., Better safe
than sorry so I said it could be probable). The remaining
four intentions were hard-to-classify (e.g., I was laughing at
him). Because of the heterogeneity of this category, we have
excluded these intentions from the subsequent analyses.
2.2.2 Postulate 2: Effect of speakers’ intentions on
communicated probability.
To communicate 50% probability the informative speakers
selected the verbal probability “evenly probable” more of-
ten than face-managing speakers who selected more ver-
bal probabilities from the bottom of the verbal probability
scale (Figure 4). In the Investment scenario, the downward
adjustment was more pronounced with the speaker face-
managing intentions, whereas in the Car scenario, the down-
ward adjustment was more pronounced with the hearer face-
managing intentions (Figure 4). Importantly, the bimodal
distribution of probabilities communicated in the Car sce-
nario for the speaker face-managing intentions shows that
subjects communicated in both directions: either a lower or
a higher probability than 50%.
To test our hypothesis we recoded the verbal probabil-
ity scale into three categories: “underestimation” for the
expressions denoting lower than 50% probability, “ade-
quate estimation” for the expression “equal probability” and
“overestimation” for the expressions denoting higher than
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Figure 4: Effect of communication intentions on verbal probability expressions chosen to convey bad news (asymmetric
bean plot). The thick bold lines represent the mean probability per condition. The polygons represent a density shape
determined by a normal density trace computed with a default bandwidth method. “Hearer FM” = hearer face-managing
intentions, “Speaker FM” = speaker face-managing intentions, “Informative” = informative intentions.
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Table 1: Effect of intentions on choice of the verbal probability expression overestimating, adequately estimating or under-
estimating the communicated probability of 50%.
Hearer
face-managing
intentions % (n)
Speaker
face-managing
intentions % (n)
Informative
intentions % (n)
Total % (n)
Investment scenario
Overestimate 35.3% (12) 29.4% (5) 31.0% (22) 32.0% (39)
Adequate estimate 38.2% (13) 23.5% (4) 63.4% (45) 50.8% (62)
Underestimate 26.5% (9) 47.1% (8) 5.6% (4) 17.2% (21)
Total 100% (34) 100% (17) 100% (71) 100% (122)
Car scenario
Overestimate 28.6% (10) 41.7% (10) 38.5% (25) 36.3% (45)
Adequate estimate 20.0% (7) 16.7% (4) 47.7% (31) 33.9% (42)
Underestimate 51.4% (18) 41.7% (10) 13.8% (9) 29.8% (37)
Total 100% (35) 100% (24) 100% (65) 100% (124)
Note. The verbal probability scale was recoded as follows: 1) underestimate: “a very small proba-
bility”, “a small probability”, “slightly probable”; 2) adequate estimate: “evenly probable”; and 3)
overestimate: “rather probable”, “probable”, “quite probable”.
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50% probability (Table 1). In the Investment scenario, sub-
jects selected verbal probabilities as a function of their inten-
tions, χ2(4) = 21.95, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.30. Speakers
adopting hearer and speaker face-managing intentions con-
veyed an underestimated probability more often than those
adopting informative intentions, respectively χ2(2) = 10.80,
p = .004, Cramer’s V = 0.32 and χ2(2) = 21.18, p < .001,
Cramer’s V = 0.49. We found no difference between the two
face-managing intentions, χ2(2) = 2.29, p = .424, Cramer’s
V = 0.21. In the Car scenario, subjects also selected ver-
bal probabilities as a function of their intentions, χ2(4) =
20.77, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.29. Subjects adopting
hearer face-managing intentions underestimated the proba-
bility more often than those adopting informative intentions,
χ
2(2) = 17.13, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.41. However, sub-
jects adopting speaker face-managing intentions in this sce-
nario had a tendency to underestimate or overestimate the
probability more often than those adopting different inten-
tions, χ2(2) = 10.69, p = .005, Cramer’s V = 0.35. Again,
we found no difference between the two face-managing in-
tentions, χ2(2) = 1.09, p = .648, Cramer’s V = 0.14.
We found similar effects of intentions on the individual-
ized numerical translations of the selected verbal probability
expressions in the Investment scenario, F(2,119) = 3.33, p =
.039, µ2 = .05, as well as in Car scenario, F(2,121) = 3.23,
p = .043, µ2 = .05. In the Investment scenario, hearer face-
managing subjects as well as speaker face-managing sub-
jects conveyed a lower probability (respectively, −7.3, 95%
CI [−15.8, 1.2], p = .093; −12.9, 95% CI [−23.9, −1.8],
p = .023) than those with informative intentions (M = 59.1,
SD = 20.8). In the Car scenario, hearer face-managing sub-
jects as well as speaker face-managing subjects conveyed
a lower probability (respectively, −12.0, 95% CI [−21.7,
−2.3], p = .016; −7.9, 95% CI [−19.0, 3.1], p = .159)
than those with informative intentions (M = 55.9, SD =
22.6). In a 2-level linear regression model with random in-
tercept, subjects with face-managing intentions communi-
cated a lower probability than informative speakers: inter-
cept b0 = 57.3, 95% CI [52.9, 61.6], t(163.239) = 26.03, p <
.001; hearer face-managing intentions slope b1 =−6.8, 95%
CI [−12.5, −1.0], t(191.142) = −2.32, p = .022, speaker
face-managing intentions slope b2 =−11.6, 95% CI [−18.9,
−4.3], t(205.787) = −3.14, p = .002.
Overall, all these analyses support the second hypothesis
predicting that face-managing intentions would lead to the
communication of a different probability than would infor-
mative intentions.
3 Discussion
In agreement with the first postulate of politeness theory, we
found that speakers intended to manage hearers’ faces from
threatening news or to manage their own faces from being
wrong. In agreement with the second postulate derived from
politeness theory, speakers communicated an altered (in the
case of our scenarios, lower) outcome probability when they
intended to be tactful or cautious than when they intended
to be informative. Speakers conveyed on average a lower
probability of occurrence for a negative outcome to manage
hearers’ faces or to manage their own faces. Our data rep-
resent the first direct and comprehensive empirical evidence
supporting the two politeness theory postulates as applied to
uncertainty communication.
Our study complements prior research showing that hear-
ers believe that speakers soften bad news by hedging and
downplaying their opinion with a vague uncertainty quan-
tifier (e.g., Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006; Bonnefon et
al., 2011; Juanchich et al., 2012). Our study demonstrates
that speakers actually use verbal probabilities not only as
probability information vehicles but also as face-managing
devices oriented either toward the speaker or the hearer
(Juanchich et al., 2012; Juanchich & Sirota, 2013). These
three intentions seem to cover most of the intentions of sub-
jects giving uncertain or bad news as very few subjects re-
ported another intention. Only a few instances of a “bet-
ter safe than sorry” intention—in which speakers intention-
ally exaggerated the probability magnitude of a negative
outcome to encourage hearers to take preventive action—
deviated systematically from the three intentions previously
studied. To study this intention, along with the other inten-
tions, in circumstances other than those investigated here,
would be an exciting avenue for future research, since dif-
ferent intentions may be at work in different circumstances.
Our study further supports the conjectures of prior re-
search postulating that personality traits, such as honesty,
are associated with specific intentions such as a higher
rate of informative intentions (Feeney & Bonnefon, 2013).
We observed some intra-individual consistency in inten-
tion selection. For example, a person who adopted a face-
managing intention to describe the probability of car break-
down was more likely to adopt the same intention when
describing the probability of losing a financial investment.
Thus, these findings indirectly support the hypothesis that
personality traits could account for differences in the adop-
tion of speakers’ intentions.
Our study diverges from previous research using simi-
lar scenarios, since it reveals that the proportion of inten-
tions of speakers differs from the one assumed by hearers
(see Juanchich et al. 2012). Speakers intended mainly to
inform hearers but hearers believed that speakers mainly in-
tended to manage their own faces when communicating bad
news (Juanchich et al. 2012). Further, speakers reported
that they aimed to be tactful more often than was believed
by hearers (Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006; Juanchich et
al. 2012). Such discrepancies may originate from purely
methodological differences or from deeper psychological
reasons. Methodological variances, such as the different ex-
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pertise status of speakers, between the two sets of studies
could account for the gap, since speakers were experts in
the “hearer” studies but not in the present study. Subjects
may perceive experts to be worrying more about their own
faces when making predictions and may assume, in turn,
a higher rate of self-face-managing intentions. Neverthe-
less, it is possible that psychological reasons, such as error
in attribution processes, could also account for the gap (e.g.,
Epley & Dunning, 2000). Speakers could have attributed
more altruistic motives to themselves than they actually had
and/or hearers could have attributed to speakers more ego-
tistical motives than they actually had; both misattributions
would lead to lower rates of speakers’ face-managing inten-
tions in our study compared to those in the “hearers” studies.
Although the observed effects appear to be robust—
estimated from a sufficient sample size and from two differ-
ent scenarios, some methodological issues could limit our
conclusions. One could argue that the order of the proba-
bility estimation question and the intention question could
account for the intention’s effect. However, previous re-
search on the effect of intentions weakens such a conclu-
sion, since the effect of the perceived intention of speakers
affected the perceived probability of hearers, whether the
probability question was before or after the intention inter-
pretation question (see Juanchich et al., 2012; Juanchich &
Sirota, 2013). One could also argue that allowing subjects to
choose only one intention instead of a combination of sev-
eral different intentions might reflect very imprecisely the
dynamic of speakers adopting intentions in real-life conver-
sations. For example, people could intend to be both infor-
mative and tactful at the same time. Future research should
therefore consider a design that captures the relative im-
pact of the intentions of speakers. However, our conclusions
should not be restricted too much by this shortcoming, since
our subjects had the opportunity to report a mixed-intention
in the “other” category if they felt that choosing one or the
other of the intentions did not sufficiently match their per-
sonal intention. Finally, one could argue that our findings
failed to indicate how people actually communicate proba-
bility in real life situations, since we have used fictitious sce-
narios. Paradoxically, we argue the opposite: we expect that
the intentions reported here would have a stronger effect in
real life situations, because politeness concerns have a larger
effect in real life than in hypothetical situations. For exam-
ple, Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) showed that women
reported their intention to confront a person uttering a sex-
ist comment in a hypothetical situation more often than they
actually did in reality, probably because of people’s need to
avoid threatening others by being confrontational. Similarly,
Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali and Dovidio (2009) showed that
people admitted to feeling upset by a racist comment in a hy-
pothetical situation more than when they were actually con-
fronted with a racist comment. Therefore, future research
should test whether people in real life situations would opt
more for face-managing intentions and communicate even
lower probability values than was the case in our fictitious
scenarios.
The present findings bear wider theoretical and practi-
cal implications. Although we have considered only ver-
bal probabilities here, the focus on how speakers use face-
managing strategies could be extended to a wider range of
verbal and numerical quantifiers. Some research already ex-
ists on these quantifiers but only from the standpoint of hear-
ers (e.g., Bonnefon et al., 2011; Sirota & Juanchich, 2012b).
Such an extension would strengthen the conclusion that a
general politeness mechanism underlies some other effects
embedded in communication contexts observed in the lit-
erature, which have been traditionally attributed to purely
mental cognitive processes. Progress in this area would be
warranted for the understanding of human cognition in its
complexity and would further advance theories of mental
phenomena (e.g., see Bonnefon et al. 2009).
The practical implications of our study can be seen at dif-
ferent levels. First, our study extends the currently prevail-
ing audience-oriented research by providing insights on the
thought processes underpinning the ways speakers commu-
nicate probabilities. Second, our study pinpoints a possi-
ble speaker-hearer discrepancy in the proportion of inten-
tions, because hearers believe speakers are more often self-
oriented than speakers actually report. Finally, our study
highlights the danger that probability misperceptions result
from improper encoding or decoding of intentions in the risk
communication process. Therefore, professional risk com-
municators should consider both sides of the communica-
tion equation: be aware of potential mismatch, and try to
make their intentions as clear as possible to hearers (Sirota
& Juanchich, 2012a).
Conclusion
In summary, we have provided the first comprehensive and
direct evidence to support the two core postulates of polite-
ness theory as applied to uncertainty communication. First,
we have shown that speakers spontaneously adopt differ-
ent communication intentions. Our subjects reported having
both informative but also face-managing intentions when
communicating the probability of negative outcomes. Sec-
ond, we have shown that speakers perform face-managing
intentions by conveying a different probability than the one
they have in mind. The subjects adopting face-managing in-
tentions communicated, on average, a lower probability than
the subjects adopting informative intentions. Overall, our
findings corroborate politeness theory, strengthen the con-
clusions of prior studies utilizing these postulates and pin-
point the potential gap between speakers’ communication
intentions and hearers’ interpretations of their intentions.
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Appendix: Scenarios, adapted from Juanchich and
Sirota (2013)
Car: Imagine that a friend of yours has just bought a new
used car without a warranty. He is explaining to you that
he thinks he made a good deal. Your friend is showing you
the car and you examine it while discussing. After a while
he asks your opinion about the car. You think that there is a
50% probability that the car will break down in the next few
months.
Select the statement you judge most appropriate to re-
spond to your friend:
“Do you think the car will break down?”
“I think that . . . ”
Investment: Imagine that a friend of yours has invested
in the stock market all the savings he has accumulated over
time. He is explaining to you that he may be a novice with
such investments but that he thinks that the stocks he bought
are very good. As he is nevertheless not completely confi-
dent in the value of the stocks, he asks your opinion. You
think that there is a 50% probability that the stock will lose
their values.
Select the statement you judge most appropriate to re-
spond to your friend:
“Do you think my stocks will lose their values?”
“I think that . . . ”
